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Do households use home-ownership to insure themselves?
Evidence across U.S. cities
Michael Amior
Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics
Jonathan Halket
University of Essex and CeMMAP, Institute for Fiscal Studies
Are households more likely to be homeowners when “housing risk” is higher? We
show that home-ownership rates and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios at the city level
are strongly negatively correlated with local house price volatility. However, causal
inference is confounded by house price levels, which are systematically correlated
with housing risk in an intuitive way: in cities where the land value is larger rela-
tive to the local cost of structures, house prices are higher and more volatile. We
disentangle the contributions of high price levels from high volatilities by build-
ing a life-cycle model of home-ownership choices. We find that higher price levels
can explain most of the lower home-ownership. Higher risk in the model leads to
slightly lower home-ownership and LTV ratios in high land value cities. The rela-
tionship between LTV and risk is corroborated by LTV’s negative correlation with
price volatility in the data and highlights the importance of including other means
of incomplete insurance in models of home-ownership.
Keywords. Home-ownership, housing risk, land share, loan-to-value, life-cycle.
JEL classification. D91, E21, R21, R31.
1. Introduction
Are households more likely to own their home when “housing risk” is higher? There is
a large literature on how homeowners use home equity to smooth the transmission of
earnings shocks into consumption.1 In this paper, we explore how the decision to be-
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come a homeowner is influenced by exposure to housing market risk and motives for
insurance.
Some people have argued that households may bring forward their home purchase
as a hedge against future house price fluctuations (e.g., Sinai and Souleles (2005), Banks,
Blundell, Oldfield, and Smith (2010)). But an earlier purchase would often necessitate
a larger mortgage and increased risk to consumption. Using a life-cycle model, we ar-
gue that in response to differences in housing risk, otherwise similar households are
more likely to differ in their liquid savings than the timing of their ownership deci-
sion. Empirically, these savings differences manifest themselves in observed variation in
loan-to-value ratios (LTV). In other words, in response to higher price risk, households
do not bring forward ownership decisions (nor do households that never own choose
to become homeowners)—but rather, conditional on owning, they may instead reduce
their LTV.
Theoretically, when markets are incomplete, there are several reasons why home-
ownership may be a peculiar and attractive form of insurance against certain risks in the
housing market.2 In Ben-Shahar (1998), Nordvik (2001), Sinai and Souleles (2005), and
Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2010), households may use home-ownership to insure them-
selves against the risk of changes to the local rental price (or user cost) of housing.
However, Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2002) suggest that if a household’s expected future
earnings are more strongly correlated with local house prices, then it already has partial
insurance through their labor earnings.3  Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) and Banks et
al. (2010) propose and find supporting evidence for a housing-ladder theory in which
households that plan on eventually owning a large house (in part because larger houses
may not be available on the rental market) are more likely to own a smaller home (rather
than rent) first if they live in a risky area. In this case, home-ownership partially insures
young households against increases in the price of a good in their future consumption
bundle (the larger house).
If financial constraints prevent some households from insuring themselves through
owning, there may be important welfare improvements from policies designed to make
ownership “accessible.” However, measuring the size or even the overall sign of the in-
surance motive on home-ownership is challenging, in part because it is difficult to iso-
late differences in households’ exposure to housing risks that are independent from
other factors that affect their home-ownership decisions.
This study proceeds in two steps. First, we present some empirical facts based on
cross-city4 variation. As documented by Banks et al. (2010), households in high-risk
cities are less likely to become homeowners. We also find that they are more likely
2Formal, direct means to insure against changes in house prices are limited (Caplin, Chan, Freeman,
and Tracy (1997)), and the correlation between house prices and other financial assets is small (Flavin and
Yamashita (2002)).
3Davidoff (2006) finds that households purchase less housing when they work in an industry whose
workers’ income are relatively more correlated with local house prices. However, he finds very small effects
of the same on the probability of home-ownership.
4Throughout we refer to Metropolitan Statistical Areas as cities and LTV always refers to the loan-to-
value at origination (that is, at the time of purchase). We will sometimes refer to the time-series standard
deviation of the annual changes to log house prices within a city as its volatility.
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to make a large down payment (in percentage-of-house-value terms) when they do
buy. These relationships hold when controlling for household characteristics. However,
causal inference is confounded by house price levels, which are systematically corre-
lated with housing volatility in an intuitive way: in cities where the land value is larger
relative to the local cost of structures, house prices are higher and more volatile. When
we look at the variation in home-ownership rates and LTV by land share (the ratio of lo-
cal land values to total housing costs), we see the same strong negative relationship. This
is true even after instrumenting for possible endogeneity, using a measure of physical lo-
cal land scarcity constructed by Saiz (2010). So, second, we use a quantitative life-cycle
model with home-ownership to disentangle the effects of higher risk from higher price
levels on the life-cycle timing of home-ownership and mortgage decisions.
We focus on the cross-sectional dimension in our empirical work, rather than the
time-series, for several reasons. For one, in the data, the amount of heterogeneity both
in household and price behavior is much larger across cities than within cities over time.
For another, the land scarcity instrument offers a way to measure the effect of higher
price levels and risk (jointly) on household behavior in the cross section. However, we
cannot use it to control for endogeneity within a city over time. In this sense, our work
is complementary to much of the previous literature (e.g., Sinai and Souleles (2005)),
which exploits within-city variation in volatility (controlling for prices) to measure the
insurance motive.
To measure the effect of higher volatility on home-ownership, we disentangle its im-
pact from that of higher prices by building a life-cycle model of home-ownership choice.
We account separately for innovations to house prices that are correlated with city wages
and those that are not. The model has a flexible housing ladder where medium-sized
housing can either be rented or owned, which enables the model to match the rela-
tive consumption of owner-occupied to rental housing in the average city according
to land scarcity. Importantly, households have another means of imperfectly insuring
themselves in addition to home-ownership: a risk-free bond.
In our setup, households have several potential reasons why they might use home-
ownership to insure against housing risk. They may use home-ownership to insure
themselves against the risk of changes to the rental price of housing, though their la-
bor earnings will provide some partial insurance. Also, the housing-ladder assumption
forces households that wish to live in large houses to own them so that the model nests
the theories of Banks et al. (2010) and Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006). Otherwise, the
basic elements of our life-cycle model of home-ownership are similar to those in Cocco
(2005), Li and Yao (2007), and others.
Key model parameters are chosen to match moments from the average city based on
land scarcity. Cities in the model differ ex ante only in their land scarcity and, through
land scarcity, their stochastic processes for house prices and wages. The model endoge-
nously captures most of the variation by land scarcity in household behavior. Given that,
we then perform counterfactual analyses where we vary one element at a time (e.g., vary
the level of prices, keeping volatility constant). We find that most of the observed varia-
tion in home-ownership across cities comes from the observed variation in house price
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levels and not the variation in risk. Instead, higher risk leads to slightly lower LTVs and
home-ownership rates in the model.
The weak effect of risk on home-ownership comes despite the large dispersion
across cities in the local volatility of house prices, which is as large as the dispersion
in price levels. Furthermore, absent other factors, more risk would lead to more home-
ownership in the model (and as in Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2010)); home-ownership
is the only asset available for purchase in the model that has returns correlated with
any shock. However, in our model, home-ownership also has many extra costs that po-
tentially increase with more price volatility (such as the transactions costs for buying a
house). Moreover, households also have an alternative to using home-ownership for in-
surance: they can accumulate precautionary, nonhousing savings instead. We find that,
given the extra costs to home-ownership, young households with rising income profiles
would rather save a little in liquid precautionary savings than save a lot to afford a down
payment. These extra savings help explain the lower LTV ratios in the high-risk cities.
The precautionary savings motive is not sufficient in our model to generate the same
magnitude of LTV dispersion as in the data, so it is likely that there are other explana-
tions beyond those discussed here that are also important in explaining the dispersion
in mortgage behavior. The qualitative concurrence of volatility and LTV in the model
and data should then be treated as corroborating our other, more definitive evidence
that higher housing risk does not lead to more home-ownership.
In the model, dispersion in price levels has a much larger effect than risk on home-
ownership choices due to the housing ladder. With a housing ladder, a household in our
model must own (rent) if it wants to live in a particularly large (small) house. Higher
prices in a city decrease housing consumption and, therefore, reduce home-ownership
rates.
Patterns in the data corroborate our conclusions that differences in price levels
cause differences in home-ownership rates through housing-ladder effects, while dif-
ferences in LTV are independent of housing-ladder effects and are instead due to risk. In
the data, once we condition on whether a household lives in an apartment or a house
(a proxy for the housing ladder in the model), the negative correlation between home-
ownership rates and price levels disappears. However, the negative relationship between
LTV and volatility does not disappear after conditioning.
In the last section of the paper, we discuss why regression-based inferences of risk’s
effect on home-ownership may be biased. Home-ownership decisions in economies
with transaction costs are durable decisions. Unsurprisingly for an (S s)-type model,
not only contemporaneous prices but also the past history of prices help determine
whether a household currently owns or not. Therefore, home-ownership rates within
the city economy are also a function of the history of prices. In many studies, expected
housing risk is measured using the volatility of area house prices around the time that
the home-ownership rate is measured.5 Thus, the volatility variable picks up the history
dependence of home-ownership on price levels, leading to potential bias.
5For example, Sinai and Souleles (2005), Banks et al. (2010). Han (2010, 2013) looks at the variance of
house price forecasts instead of house prices, where prices are forecasted using an AR(1) process and the
variance of innovations is forecasted using a GARCH(11) process.
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1.1 Related literature
A key contribution of this paper is that we document systematic cross-city variation
in home-ownership and LTV using both micro- and aggregate (city-level) data. Banks
et al. (2010) use both variation within and across U.S. states and United States–United
Kingdom comparisons on home-ownership. Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) look across de-
veloped countries for the effect of financial market imperfections on home-ownership.
Albouy (2009a, 2009b) looks at the effects of cross-city variation in taxes and ameni-
ties. Han (2010) looks at the effects of housing risks on housing demand and homeown-
ers’ propensity to move, using cross-city and time variation. City-level data is appealing,
since it is more plausible to assume, as we do, that financial market conditions are sim-
ilar across the areas, in contrast to cross-country comparisons. But there is still enough
plausibly exogenous, observable variation in price levels and risk across cities to find
systematic differences in household choices.
Han (2008) builds a model where homeowners may choose to accumulate more
housing so as to hedge against housing risks. Under the assumption of separable utility
and no income risk, she provides conditions for when the hedging motive outweighs the
household’s normal disinclination to hold riskier assets (as in Rosen, Rosen, and Holtz-
Eakin (1984)). Han (2013) finds evidence that the hedging motive may be priced into
housing risk premia in markets where housing supply is constrained. Our work expands
on this contribution by adding the option of renting and looking at home-ownership
and borrowing behavior jointly.
There are a few studies that examine the opposite causal direction—the effect of
home-ownership and borrowing decisions on prices. Stein (1995) proposes a model
where price changes have asymmetric effects on sales due to down payment constraints.
Lamont and Stein (1999) find that cities with high LTVs have higher rather than lower
elasticities of house prices with respect to changes in income, but the instrument they
use turns out to be weak. Genesove and Mayer (1997) find that within a specific market
(the Boston condominium market), sellers with higher LTVs have higher expected time
on the market and receive higher prices.
We do not offer a general equilibrium model of housing; neither do we deal with
issues of regional mobility6 or time variation in the stochastic process for prices. By us-
ing the time-invariant differences in land scarcity across cities to calibrate the different
price processes, we largely sidestep issues of endogeneity that may normally arise from
examining only one side of a market. Providing structural explanations for the relation-
ship between land values and house prices and for the existence of a housing ladder are
interesting explorations that we hope the facts presented here will encourage.
The rest of this paper is as follows: Section 2 shows the striking variation in home-
ownership, LTV, house prices, and housing risk across U.S. cities, Section 3 presents the
model, and Section 4 discusses its parametrization. Section 5 presents our results. Sec-
tion 6 discusses bias in regressions and concludes. We include an appendix here with
6See Halket and Vasudev (2014) for a model with both, but without the changes in housing supply that
we would need here to close our model. Paciorek (2012) has a model of housing supply where the elastic-
ities differ according to factors like land scarcity. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) look at inter- and
intraregional risk sharing and home values but not home-ownership.
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many further details on our empirics and model parametrization, while an additional
appendix, available in a supplementary file on the journal website, http://qeconomics.
org/supp/346/supplement.pdf, contains some further regression results and robustness
exercises. Additional resources are also available in a supplementary file on the journal
website, http://qeconomics.org/supp/346/code_and_data.zip.
2. Home-ownership and loan-to-value ratios in the data
In this section, we present some basic facts from cross-city data. First, we show that
local home-ownership rates are decreasing in price volatility (as Banks et al. (2010)
document). But we cannot draw causal inference from this result, because local price
volatilities are themselves closely correlated with local price levels. And indeed, home-
ownership is also strongly negatively correlated with price levels across cities.
We then show that cities with high and volatile prices are also characterized by low
LTV ratios. So households in these cities are less likely to own, and when they do choose
to own, their purchases are less leveraged. But, again, it is not clear solely from the data
whether these outcomes are insurance-type responses to local price volatility, local price
levels, or something else entirely.
Local price levels and volatilities are closely related for a simple intuitive reason.
They share the same statistical source: variation in land share, that is, the share of the
price of the city’s typical house that is attributable to the value of land (as opposed to
the cost of the structure). As a result, it is not possible to empirically disentangle the im-
pact of price volatilities from that of price levels without the use of behavioral models
and counterfactuals.
2.1 Data
This study is based on a number of data sources, with our analysis restricted to the cross
section of 2000 for simplicity.7 Ownership rates and local mean price levels (based on
reported values of owned dwellings) are constructed from the Integrated Public Use Mi-
crodata Series (IPUMS) 5 percent extract of the U.S. 2000 census, organized by Ruggles,
Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek (2010). We use two different mea-
sures of LTV ratios, taken from the American Housing Survey (AHS) and the Monthly
Interest Rate Survey (MIRS);8 the latter is maintained by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA). Quarterly metropolitan house price indices are also taken from the
FHFA9 to estimate local price volatilities. Our metropolitan-level average earnings se-
ries come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regional program.10 Finally, we
use data on local land scarcity from Saiz (2010) and land share from Davis and Palumbo
7In the supplementary appendix, we show that the general patterns also hold for 1990, with the exception
of the systematic patterns of LTV discussed below, which have become considerably stronger since 1990.
8http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/Monthly-Interest-Rate-Data.aspx.
9All-transactions index; http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index-
Datasets.aspx. The Case–Shiller indices distributed by Standard & Poor’s (which is the other popular
publicly available data set) cover a much smaller sample of cities.
10http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm.
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(2008); we discuss these further below. Where survey data are used, we restrict our sam-
ple to households with heads aged 21–75,11 living in houses or apartments. Throughout
this study, we weight all city-level regressions and scatter plots; our weights correspond
to the local sample of households with heads aged 21–75, living in houses or flats (as
estimated from the census extract).
We identify cities with the set of (primary12) metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), of
which there are 297 in the census data in 2000. However, we restrict our sample to the 221
MSAs for which FHFA price data, BEA wage data, and the land scarcity instrument are
available. Of these, 42 cities are available in the AHS (for the estimation of local LTV ra-
tios) and in the Davis–Palumbo (2008) data on land shares (itself based on the AHS) and
just 25 are available in the metropolitan MIRS LTV data, although these tend to be the
most prominent cities. Further details on the city sample can be found in Appendix A.
Our measure of local house price volatility is the standard deviation of log annual
changes in the FHFA local price index (measured in the first quarter of each year) over
the previous 5 years (1995–2000).13 This approach is based on Banks et al. (2010). We
estimate wage volatility in the same way using annual BEA data.
We present much of the evidence on cross-city correlations between ownership
rates/LTV and price levels/volatilities graphically. But there are of course concerns that
any observed effects will simply be driven by differences in local household compo-
sition. Therefore, in all cross-city analyses (including graphs), we use local ownership
rates and LTV that condition on local household characteristics and household income
in particular. See Section A.1 for more details.
There are concerns of large measurement error in the LTV data estimated from the
AHS (Lam and Kaul (2003)), so we also present our analysis using MIRS data. The MIRS
reports (among other statistics) mean LTV ratios for conventional (i.e., excluding fed-
erally guaranteed Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA)
loans; see Appendix A for description of loan types) single-family loans in 25 cities, based
on a monthly survey of mortgage lenders. However, the AHS does have a number of ad-
vantages for our purposes: it covers more cities, it covers nonconventional loans, and
(being a household survey) it allows us to control for household characteristics.
Our data on land shares are taken from Davis and Palumbo (2008).14 They construct
a data set containing, by city and quarter, the average local house price as well as the
share of the local price that is attributable to land value and structure cost, respectively,
so that
house valuejt = land valuejt + structure valuejt 
ljt = land valuejthouse valuejt 
11In the case of the AHS, age is calculated at purchase year.
12We do not aggregate these into “consolidated” areas.
13The supplementary file contains robustness results for alternative volatility window lengths.
14Their data are available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values.
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where ljt is then the land share for city j at time t. Their land value estimates are the
residual part of house values within a city that is not explained by structure costs. Since
it is partially based on the AHS, these data are only available for 42 MSAs in our sample.
As a supply-side instrument for the share of the price attributable to land, we adopt
Saiz’s (2010) measure of local land scarcity, based on physical constraints on housing
supply. For each city, this is the share of a circle around the city center, of 50 km radius,
that is either steeply inclined land (at an incline of over 15%) or water.15 Saiz estimates
this variable with satellite data.
2.2 Home-ownership and LTV
As the first panel of Figure 1 shows, the local home-ownership rate (conditional on
household income and other characteristics) is negatively correlated across cities with
house price volatility. The predicted (ordinary least squares (OLS)) effect shows owner-
ship rates ranging from about 07 (for the least volatile cities) to 04 (for the most), with
an R squared of 41 percent. But, as the second panel shows, it is also strongly negatively
correlated with price levels (see the first two panels of Figure 1): here, the correlation
is 60 percent. It should be noted that New York appears to be an important outlier in
these home-ownership figures; however, we argue in Section 5 that this relates to the
local abundance of apartments and, anyway, the results presented here are robust to
excluding it.
Unsurprisingly, volatilities and levels are themselves closely related, with a correla-
tion of 38 percent (see Figure 2). Consequently, it is difficult to disentangle their respec-
tive effects. To see this graphically, we isolate the portion of variation in volatilities that
is uncorrelated with price levels (i.e., the residuals from an OLS regression of volatilities
on levels). In the first panel of Figure 3, we plot home-ownership against these volatility
residuals: the effect is much weaker than before, with less than half the coefficient and
Figure 1. Home-ownership, price risk, and price levels.
15Mian and Sufi (2011) and Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) similarly use this data to instrument for
elasticities of supply, while Paciorek (2012) builds a model of housing supply that directly connects Saiz’s
measure of land scarcity to the theoretical elasticity.
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Figure 2. Price levels and risk.
Figure 3. Home-ownership and residual price levels against volatilities.
an R squared of under 5 percent. In the second panel, we plot home-ownership against
price level residuals (from a regression on volatility). The relationship is stronger than
the one from the volatility residuals,16 though still much weaker than in Figure 1: the
correlation is 23 percent.
As with home-ownership, average city loan-to-value ratio at origination (LTV), as
measured by the AHS (controlling for household characteristics including income), is
strongly negatively correlated with both local price volatility and level (Figure 4). In the
first panel, moving from the lowest to highest price volatilities in the MSA sample, fol-
lowing the OLS-predicted line, LTV falls from 085 to 079, with an R squared of 19 per-
cent. But again, unsurprisingly, the second panel shows a strong negative correlation
between LTV and price levels of 46%.
16This is perhaps unsurprising given that volatility is measured with more error than levels.
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Figure 4. LTV (AHS), price risk, and price levels.
Figure 5. LTV (MIRS), price risk, and price levels.
These relationships also exist for the MIRS data, as Figure 5 shows. The correlation
is much tighter than for the AHS data: the AHS is likely to be subject to substantial sam-
pling and reporting error. But the magnitudes of the effects on LTV are very similar for
the two data sets: for example, for volatility, the MIRS effect is −12 compared to −10 for
the AHS. Notice that the mean LTV is lower for the MIRS (077) than for the AHS (084)
estimates. This is in part because the MIRS sample is restricted to conventional loans
only: the AHS mean for conventional loans is 080.
It might be argued that these LTV patterns have a supply-side explanation, due to
the intricacies of American mortgage institutions. But in Appendix A, we show that ge-
ographically non-varying conforming loan limits do not drive the observed cross-city
variation in LTV and neither do differences in local mortgage interest rates. It is unlikely
then that any potential geographic differences in default propensities are causing the
observed variation in LTV via differences in default risk premia. So in the model, we ab-
stract from default.
Also, there may be concern that the variation in LTV is merely arising from cross-city
differences in shares of mortgage holders. Indeed, almost a quarter of homeowners (in
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the 5 percent census extract of 2000) do not hold mortgages. However, it turns out that
the local mortgage share (among homeowners) is uncorrelated with the ownership rate
itself, so it is not likely to be driving our results. Last, we also show in Appendix A that the
LTV patterns are equally strong for first-time buyers as for repeat buyers, so our results
are unlikely to arise from existing homeowners trading up after periods of high price
growth.
To summarize, expensive and price-volatile cities tend to be characterized by low
ownership rates, but also low LTV ratios. Households in these cities are less likely to
own, and when they do buy a house, they take a bigger equity stake. But we cannot
make causal statements based on this evidence, given the close association between
local price volatility and levels.
2.3 Association between house price volatility and levels
To understand the close link between volatilities and levels, it is necessary to view house
prices as the sum of two components: land values and structure costs. Price volatilities
and levels are correlated across cities because they share the same statistical source:
variation in local land shares, as demonstrated in Figure 6.17 The intuition is simple:
compared to structure costs, the price of land tends to vary much more both across cities
and within cities over time; as a result, due to a simple composition effect, cities with
large land shares tend to have higher and more volatile prices. We elaborate on this in
Appendix A.5.
Given the strong empirical connection between price volatility and levels, we have
to disentangle their effects on household choices with a model. One approach would
be to simulate ownership and LTV decisions in cities with different land shares. These
cities are characterized by different local price volatilities and levels (this is what mat-
ters for the simulation), and these can be estimated from the data (by reference to their
empirical relationship with land share).
Figure 6. Price risk and levels, and land share.
17To ensure comparability, all data (including house prices) for this figure are taken from Davis and
Palumbo (2008) for 42 MSAs.
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The problem is that the correlation between land share and ownership or LTV can-
not be considered causal a priori. Omitted variation in local productivity or housing de-
mand should not be a concern, because we are controlling for household income in our
estimates of ownership and LTV. But we are worried about reverse causation from own-
ership/LTV to price levels/volatilities and land share.
There are two ways to address this issue. The first is to simulate a general equilibrium
model, where land share, price levels, and volatilities are all determined endogenously.
However, the determination of these housing market outcomes is not the focus of this
paper, and the equilibrium conditions would significantly complicate computation.
The second approach, which we choose, is to find a suitable instrument for land
share that will only affect ownership and LTV indirectly, that is, via local price levels
and volatilities. We opt for a measure of local land scarcity, described in the data sec-
tion above. It is based on local geographical features, namely inclined land and water.
Conditional on household income, this instrument is unlikely to affect tenure and LTV
in a significant way directly; the effect should only come through local housing con-
ditions (captured by price levels and volatility). The first stage is sufficiently powerful.
Figure 7 shows a strong relationship between land scarcity and land share: a 1 percent-
age point increase in land scarcity is associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase in
land share. Unsurprisingly, Figure 8 shows there is a strong positive relationship between
land scarcity and price volatilities/levels as well, with correlations of 28 and 30 percent,
respectively. Finally, Figures 9 and 10 show the relationships between home-ownership
and LTV, and land share/scarcity.
As with land share, we confirm in the supplementary appendix that the entire effect
of land scarcity on price levels comes through the land value component (and not struc-
ture costs). And the effect on price volatility is entirely a composition effect: land-scarce
cities have larger land shares, and local land values are more volatile than structure costs.
Figure 7. Land share and land scarcity.
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Figure 8. Price risk and levels, and land scarcity.
Figure 9. Home-ownership, land share, and land scarcity.
Figure 10. LTV, land share, and land scarcity.
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3. Household choice model
In this section, we build a life-cycle model of households that work and consume in a
particular city for their entire lives. Several of the assumptions we make deserve extra
attention.
We severely limit households’ access to insurance in a way that should bias the
model in favor of using home-ownership as insurance: we do not allow for intercity mi-
gration, so households cannot use moving away from the city as a source of insurance
against house price changes;18 the only asset besides a house is a risk-free bond.
Though the model is “partial equilibrium,” rental prices are tied to sale prices
through an implied equilibrium relationship that leads to counterfactually high rental
volatility. In the model, rents will be as volatile as house prices, while in the data they
are clearly lower.19 Excess volatility in rents as compared to prices will again bias the
model in favor of home-ownership as insurance. Also, all house price changes are com-
mon to all houses within a city; we abstract away from house-level idiosyncratic changes
in prices and rents. This too favors the home-ownership-as-insurance hypothesis as
idiosyncratic volatility would fall more heavily on homeowners in the model (a renter
could easily move to an alternative house if she gets an idiosyncratic increase in rent).
Time is discrete and each period in the economy corresponds to 1 year in the data.
Households are born at age a= 21 and live at most to age a= 75. A household is indexed
by i and lives in a city, indexed by j, for its entire life. The city has a time-invariant land
scarcity λj .
3.1 Preferences
Households have recursive preferences of the Kreps and Porteus (1978) type.20 The
household gets instantaneous utility from a nondurable consumption good c and a
durable housing good h according to
u(ctht at)=
(
c1−σt hσt
)
/F(at)
The path for the family size adjustment factor, F : {2122    75} → R++, is exogenous,
constant across households of the same age, and known to the household at birth.21 The
18See Sinai and Souleles (2009) for a model where owning can hedge moving risk. There the risk is that
a household moves to a market whose house prices are highly correlated with the household’s previous
market. In our model, all moves will be within-city moves and so this risk is maximized.
19For instance, see Campbell, Davis, Gallin, and Martin (2009) and Verbrugge (2008).
20These preferences nest time-separable preferences but allow for the separate consideration of in-
tertemporal smoothing (savings) and smoothing across states within a given period (risk aversion).
21Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003), and Li and
Yao (2007) each let family size affect a household’s discount factor. In Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Li
and Yao (2007), the life-cycle profile for family size is deterministic and homogeneous across households
of the same age. Attanasio et al. (1999) and Cagetti (2003) let the profiles vary by education. Browning and
Lusardi (1996) have a stochastic process for family size (see their paper for more references). Gervais (2002),
Campbell and Cocco (2003), Li and Yao (2007), and Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) all use Cobb–Douglas
preferences over nondurable consumption and housing that are consistent with evidence from Davis and
Ortalo-Magne (2011) that housing expenditure shares are approximately constant across cities.
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household’s utility at time t, Vt , is then given by the composite of its instantaneous utility
and its future expected utility,
Vt =
[
(1−β)u(ctht at)1−φ +β(RtVt+1)1−φ
]1/(1−φ)

where future expected utility is given by RtVt+1 = (Et[V 1−γt+1 ])1/1−γ . γ measures risk aver-
sion, and φ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Additive utility
is a special case where φ= γ.
Households get utility at death from bequeathing wealth, Vt+1(· at = 75) = (bt+1 +
p
j
t+1ht)
1−σ .
3.2 Labor earnings
Households receive labor earnings Yijt until an exogenously set retirement age R, after
which they receive a pension. Yijt contains two parts: idiosyncratic components and a
city-specific component. The city-specific component W jt , which we call wages, follows
a geometric random walk. The idiosyncratic components are Lit , a geometric random
walk with deterministic age-dependent drift, and a transitory shock ρit as in, for example,
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004a):
Yt =LitW jt 
it
Lit = exp f (at)Lit−1ψit
W
j
t =W jt−1νjt 
where lnψit ∼ N (−05σ2ψσ2ψ), ln
it ∼ N (−05σ2
σ2
), and lnνjt ∼ N (μν − 05σ2ν (λj)
σ2ν (λj)). The variance of innovations to wages, v
j
t , can differ across cities according to
their land scarcity; however, all cities have common drifts. After retirement, the house-
hold gets a proportion (adjusted for growth in the city) of its final salary, Yt = ζLiRW jt . All
households’ income is taxed at a rate ty .
3.3 Housing market
At any time, homes may either be rented (τit = 0) or owned (τit = 1), but not both simul-
taneously. There is a housing ladder that forces households to choose rented housing
from the set Hr and owner-occupied housing from the set Ho.
Housing can be bought at a unit price pjt , which contains two components: one cor-
related with labor earnings and one uncorrelated with labor earnings,
p
j
t =QjtW jt 
where Qjt = Qjt−1εjt and lnεjt ∼ N (−05σ2ε(λj)σ2ε(λj)). The variance of innovations to
the uncorrelated component, εjt , like those of the correlated component, differs across
cities; city-specific drifts remain common.22
22There is an extensive literature (e.g., Case and Shiller (1989)) that documents a small predictable com-
ponent in house prices, and Han (2010, 2013) uses price processes with some predictability. For computa-
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An owner pays proportions tp and δj of the value of the house each period toward
property taxes and maintenance, respectively. The housing maintenance means houses
do not depreciate and the maintenance required may vary across cities. A household
may not “build on” to its house; to adjust the size of an owner-occupied house, it must
sell its current one and buy a new house. Each time a household buys a house, it pays a
fraction θb of the value of the house as a transaction cost.
A renter pays only the spot rental price per unit of housing sjt , which we set so that a
risk-neutral landlord would be indifferent between renting or selling the house, subject
to paying income tax on its rental income,
s
j
t =
tp + δj + rb −μν1+ rb
1− ty p
j
t 
where rb is the risk-free interest rate at which households and landlords can borrow.
Households have three potential motives for owning: the cost of renting exceeds the
user cost of owning due to the taxation of rental income, the housing ladder restricts the
size of rental housing, and several insurance motives.
3.4 Assets
Besides housing, the only other financial asset for the household is a risk-free one pe-
riod bond, bit+1, which pays rl to savers but costs (net) rb > rl to borrow. Households may
borrow at this rate, subject to a borrowing constraint. Housing is the sole form of collat-
eral. We model this by giving households a home equity line of credit.23 The LTV at the
time of purchase is simply the ratio − b
i
t+1
p
j
th
i
t
.
When purchasing a home, households can borrow up to (1 − d) of the value of the
house, where d is the down payment constraint. Thereafter, as long as they continue to
be homeowners, agents may borrow up to (1 − d) of the value of the house. They may
also choose to roll over their debt after making an interest payment. So at any time, the
borrowing constraint is
bit+1 ≥min
{−(1− d)τitpjthit (1− 1m)bit}
where 1m is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the household chooses to move in the
period.24
tional reasons, we follow Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Campbell and Cocco (2003), Cocco (2005), Yao and
Zhang (2005), Li and Yao (2007), and Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) and assume shocks to house prices are
permanent.
23We also call this a mortgage throughout. It is worth reiterating that there is only one asset in the model,
the risk-free bond; households are not allowed to simultaneously hold “savings” and a “mortgage.” Such an
alternative, if allowed, would generally be unattractive due to the higher interest rate on debt. However, be-
cause of the borrowing constraints in the model, some households might find it slightly attractive. Modeling
both assets separately would require an extra state variable though.
24This borrowing constraint is different from the more typical one that restricts borrowing to be weakly
less than some percentage of the house value (bit+1 ≥ −(1− d)τitpjt hit ). With risky house prices, for a house-
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If the household chooses to sell its home, it must pay off all existing debt, though
another loan can be taken out if another home is purchased. A household that does not
have positive total cash-in-hand (housing wealth plus financial wealth plus current in-
come) will not be able to pay off the mortgage it has (the debt it owes) on its home and
will not choose to move in this period. We do not allow the household to choose to de-
fault (see Jeske and Krueger (2005) for a model with mortgage default), but households
can default implicitly by dying. After retirement, we do not allow households to take out
new loans, but they may continue with their old loan.25 This effectively ensures in our
calibrated economy that all households reach age 75 debt-free.
Newborn households are “born” with no housing, but they draw their initial wealth
from a distribution Πb, which is a probability distribution on R+.
3.5 Household’s problem
The problem of the household is to choose consumption, house size and ownership, and
savings, given its permanent and transitory earnings components, housing and assets
at the beginning of the period, and prices, subject to budget, borrowing, and choice-set
constraints, and the initial condition and laws of motion for Qjt , W
j
t (which we do not
repeat below) for all variables:26
V
(
atLt
t bt τt−1ht−1;Qjt W jt λj
)
= max
ct ht bt+1τt
[
(1−β)u(ctht at)1−φ
+β(RV (at+1Lt+1
t+1 bt+1 τtht;Qjt+1W jt+1λj))1−φ]1/(1−φ)
s.t. ct + bt+1 + ht
(
(1− τt)sjt + τtpjt (δj + tp + 1+ 1mθb)
)
≤ bt(1+ r)+Yt(1− ty)+ ht−1τt−1pjt 
bit+1 ≥
{
min
{−(1− d)τitpjthit (1− 1m)bit} if at ≤ 65,
min
{
0 (1− 1m)bit
}
 else,
r =
{
rl if bt ≥ 0,
rb if bt < 0,
c ≥ 0 τtht ∈
{
0Ho
}
 (1− τt)ht ∈
{
0Hr
}
 τt ∈ {01}
4. Parametrization
In Section 5, we will compare how households that live in cities with different expected
prices and volatilities behave differently in both the model and the data. Since our model
hold near the typical borrowing constraint, a fall in the value of a house means the household must reduce
the amount borrowed. If house price volatility is large enough, the effective down payment constraint (the
amount the household could borrow and still be able to repay in any state of the world next period) may be
much tighter than the actual (d).
25That is, a retired household’s borrowing constraint is bit+1 ≥min{0 (1− 1m)bit}.
26Variable superscripts are dropped where obvious.
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Table 1. Invariant parameters.
Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor 095
σ Housing’s share in utility 030
φ Inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IIES) 5
γ Risk aversion 3
ty Income tax 020
tp Property tax 001
σ
 Std. dev. of the idiosyncratic transitory shock 025
σψ Std. dev. of the idiosyncratic permanent shock 0098
rb Interest rate on loans 6%
rl Interest rate on savings 4%
d Down payment 01
θb Home buyer’s transaction cost 008
ζ Replacement rate for pensions 06
is partial equilibrium and we have argued that differences in land scarcity are plausibly
exogenous to differences in home-ownership rates and LTV except through the cross-
city variation in price behavior, the cities that we simulate with our model will differ
ex ante only by their land scarcity. Parameters indexed by j vary ex ante across cities
according to their land scarcity, λj . All other parameters remain constant across cities.
In this section, we discuss the calibration/estimation of some key parameters; the
calibration of the remainder are discussed in Appendix B (see Table 1 for their values).
These key parameters are all those that vary across cities and the housing-ladder param-
eters in Hr and Ho. These are estimated in three steps.
Step 1. We initialize the model so that the cross section of relative prices and wages in
a particular year, 2000, is the same in the model as in the data. We assume σjν , σ
j
ε, p
j
2000,
W
j
2000, and δ
j vary across cities in the model with respect to land scarcity according to
the same (linear) relationship estimated in the data:
σ
j
ν = αν +βνλj (1)
σ
j
ε = αε +βελj (2)
p
j
2000 = αp +βpλj (3)
W
j
2000 = αw +βwλj (4)
δj = (1− αδ −βδλj)δh (5)
We run OLS regressions on equations (1)–(4), with land scarcity as the independent vari-
able and a range of dependent variables: local price volatility (the standard deviation
over annual growth rates, 1995–2000), wage volatility, price level, and wage level. We
take local wage levels from the BEA data of 2000, and estimate price levels (as discussed
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above) from the 5 percent census extract of 2000.27 The δj are set using the relation-
ship between land share and maintenance described below. This entire step can be done
without computing the household’s problem.
Step 2. We simulate a set of cities with different land scarcities, each with 200,000
households. Each household is born at some date at most 54 years before 2000. For each
city, we draw realizations of the annual innovations to prices and wages so that they
equal their 2000 relative value in 2000.
Step 3. We choose the parameters in the housing ladder so that specific moments
in the simulated model data best match those in the data in 2000. The values of the
housing-ladder parameters are found by repeatedly computing the household’s prob-
lem for different values of the parameters (and repeating Step 2) and choosing the pair
that provides the best match.28
4.1 Housing
We assume that a city’s housing supply is fixed and that homeowners pay a maintenance
cost to replace depreciated housing capital. So the (growth-adjusted) relationship be-
tween housing depreciation and housing investment is (abusing notation)
δh = Ih −(pH)
pH

For the aggregate value of housing, pH, we use nonfarm owner-occupied housing
from the National Income and Product Accounts’ (NIPA’s) Historical-Cost Net Stock of
Residual Fixed Assets table. Investment in housing is computed using nonfarm owner-
occupied housing from NIPA’s Historical-Cost Investment in Residential Fixed Assets.
This gives δh = 0017. These values from NIPA are the value of the structures and do
not include the value of land. For any city, j, 1− αδ −βδλj is the share of structure costs
in house value. So for each city, we set δj = (1 − αδ − βδλj)δh, where αδ = 0306 and
βδ = 0470 are the intercept and slope, respectively, of the linear relationship estimated
between land share and land scarcity (see the supplementary appendix for further de-
tails). The rent-to-price ratio in the cities will therefore vary slightly with land scarcity
due to changes in δj .
We allow households to choose any size rental up to a maximum: Hr = (0 h¯r]. We
impose a minimum owner-occupied house size but no other restriction: Ho = [¯h
o∞).
We use the model to set ¯h
o and h¯r so that (i) cities with the mean land scarcity in the
model have an average home-ownership rate that matches the fitted home-ownership
rate at the mean land scarcity in the data and (ii) the mean ratio of owner-occupied
house sizes to rental house sizes in the model matches the fitted ratio (in square feet) in
the data. Matching the two moments, the home-ownership rate and the relative hous-
ing sizes, identifies the two parameters uniquely. We do not have a formal proof, but
27Further details about the estimates of the α and β coefficients as well as estimates using alternative
windows for measuring volatility can be found in the supplementary appendix.
28A simulated method of moments computed over a grid of potential parameter values.
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casual introspection (if ¯h
o increases, then h¯r must decrease to keep the ownership rate
constant, but h¯r must increase to keep the relative house size ratio constant) and all
computation thus far confirm it.
4.2 Prices
To estimate the parameters in the price processes, we match year/city panels of house
prices (from the FHFA) and average wages (from the BEA). These data are used to cal-
culate, for each city, a covariance matrix of annual growth rates of wages and house
prices over 1995–2000.29 We have assumed in the model that νjt affects prices and wages
equally. So we could use either wage growth variance or price–wage growth covari-
ance as alternative estimates for σ2ν (λj). The mean (across cities) wage growth variance
(000021) is almost twice as large as the mean price–wage growth covariance (000011).
However, if we restrict our attention to the 30 largest cities in the sample, the two statis-
tics do match (they are both 000015). We choose to use the wage growth variances to
estimate αν and βν .
Conditional on αν and βν , house prices are used to estimate αε, βε, and βp. Due to
the homogeneity in our model and since we only set the housing-ladder parameters in
a later step, we are free to normalize αw and αp. Table 2 shows some moments for the
key parameters. The results from the instrumental variable regressions are available in
the supplementary appendix.
5. Results
5.1 Moments in models and data
Table 3 shows the results from the average city by land scarcity compared to the data.
Since the house size parameters were chosen so that the model matched the data on the
Table 2. Matched parameters.
Parameter Description Mean Value Interquartile Range
σν Std. dev of shock to wages (corr with house prices) 0012 0010–0013
σε Std. dev of idiosyncratic shock to house prices 0022 0015–0025
¯h
o Min owner-occupied house size 4 4–4
h¯r Max rental house size 825 825–825
δj Housing maintenance 00112 0012–0010
p2000 Price level in 2000 1 081–109
W2000 Wage level in 2000 1 096–102
Note: Price and wage levels are normalized so that prices and wages are equal to 1 for all cities with the average level of land
scarcity in the year 2000. The units on the house size parameters are median household earnings for 21 year olds, and these
parameters are not changed across cities. The “interquartile range” is the difference in the predicted value of the parameter
(as predicted from an OLS regression on land scarcity) between the city at the 25th and 75th percentile of the land scarcity
distribution.
29Results are mostly robust to changes in sample dates with the exception that βε would go up if the
post-2007 data are used and αεwould go up if the data included either the recent bust or the late 1980’s
bust.
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Table 3. Model fit.
Data Source City Sample Data Model
Home-ownership rate Census 221 062 063
Home-ownership rate under 65 Census 221 061 061
Owned/rented home size ratio AHS 42 207 205
LTV AHS 42 084 071
LTV (conventional loans only) AHS 42 080 071
LTV (conventional loans only) MIRS 25 077 071
Note: This table compares key parameters in the data with the model. The third column shows the number of cities on
which the data estimates are based (see Appendix A for further details). The fourth column gives the mean (weighted by census
sample size) for the relevant variable across those cities (NB: restricting the larger samples to 25 cities has only a negligible
effect on the estimated means). The AHS LTV estimates are conditional on household characteristics; see Appendix A for further
details and the estimation procedure. We also report the mean LTV across cities for the sample of conventional loans in the AHS.
This makes it more comparable with the LTV estimate from the MIRS (the final row), whose sample excludes nonconventional
loans.
Table 4. Home-ownership profile: data and model.
Age Data Source City Sample Data: Mean Model: Mean
21–35 Census 221 038 025
36–50 Census 221 067 072
51–65 Census 221 076 088
66–75 Census 221 078 068
Note: See notes under Table 3. This table reports mean ownership rates by age group.
home-ownership rate and relative house sizes, it is not surprising that we attain a very
good fit along these lines. The model also matches the data well if we consider only those
households 65 years old and younger. Given the model’s relatively simple characteriza-
tion of post-retirement life, this is also not surprising. Table 4 shows that the model also
matches the profile of home-ownership relatively well, though there are too few young
and too many middle-aged homeowners. We conjecture that additional heterogeneity,
particularly in family size (which here does not vary within age), would cure the excess
steepness.
Though no parameters were chosen to match the LTV rates (conditional on taking
a loan), the model is able to match the data from the AHS relatively well; however, it
is somewhat lower. This is perhaps a result of only having one nonhousing asset in the
model. In the data, we do not observe the mortgage net of other financial assets, which
is the relevant variable in the model.
Table 5 shows the slopes of linear regressions of city-level home-ownership and LTV
on land scarcity in the data and in the model. The model is able to explain much of the
difference in home-ownership and LTV across cities. A 10 percentage point increase in
land scarcity implies a decrease in home-ownership of 25 and 20 percentage points
in the data and model, respectively. Likewise, the same increase in land scarcity im-
plies a decrease in LTV of 07 and 06 percentage points in the data and model, respec-
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Table 5. Slopes with respect to land scarcity.
Age Own: Data Own: Model LTV: Data (AHS) LTV: Data (MIRS) LTV: Model
All ages −025∗∗ −020† −007∗∗ −008∗∗ −006†
21–35 −023∗∗ −032 −009∗∗ N/A −016
36–50 −024∗∗ −022† −005∗∗ N/A 004
51–65 −018∗∗ −009 −008 N/A 022
66–75 −017∗∗ −013† 002 N/A 000†
Note: This table compares cross-city slopes of ownership rates and LTV with respect to land scarcity, for both the data and
model. For the data, reported coefficients are taken from cross-city OLS regressions (weighted by census sample size) of mean
ownership or LTV (for the age group in question) on land scarcity. The local ownership and AHS LTV estimates are conditional
on observed household characteristics (see Appendix A for the estimation procedure), but not the MIRS. Also, there is no
available disaggregation of the MIRS data by age group. Cross-city OLS regressions on simulated data weight all cities equally
and do not control for household characteristics (since the sample of households in each city is the same). ∗∗ signifies that the
estimate from the data is significant at the 95 percent confidence level. † signifies that the model estimate falls within the 95
percent confidence interval of the data.
tively. Generally speaking, the difference in home-ownership rates across land scarcity
declines with age, a pattern that the model matches.30
As in the data, the relationship between LTV and land scarcity for the most part be-
comes less negative with age, turning positive for the older ages (although the coeffi-
cients are not significant for these ages). The shortcoming of not being able to observe
net financial assets in the data is likely to be more acute for older households that have
accrued savings, and perhaps explains why the increase in the coefficients is sharper
in the model than in the data. Fortunately, late-life LTV figures are relatively inconse-
quential for the cross-city dispersion: in the data, 80 percent of new loans are taken by
households under 50 years old and 97 percent by households under 65 years old. Thus
the restriction that, in the model, households over 65 are not allowed to take new loans
is probably not important for the LTV results.
5.2 Counterfactuals
In the data and the model, cities with high price volatility have lower home-ownership
rates and LTVs, but they also have high price levels and high wages, among other dif-
ferences. To disentangle these different contributions, we simulate five variations to
the baseline model economy, each time allowing only one of the parameters to vary
and keeping the other parameters at their mean land scarcity values. Since the parame-
ters have different implicit units, for comparability we again look at slopes with respect
to land scarcity. In two of the counterfactuals, we allow the variances to vary by land
scarcity according to equations (1) and (2), respectively. In a third and fourth, we simu-
late cities with different land scarcities so that they have relative prices or wages in the
year 2000 that vary according to equations (3) and (4), respectively. In the final counter-
factual, we vary the maintenance in cities according to equation (5). Table 6 shows the
coefficient from regressing home-ownership and LTV on land scarcity from each of the
30This may explain why Sinai and Souleles (2005) find a positive effect on ownership from the interaction
between mobility (which is negatively correlated with age) and rent volatility (which is positively correlated
with land scarcity).
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Table 6. Contribution from various elements:
slopes with respect to land scarcity.
Parameter Home-Ownership: Slopes LTV: Slopes
σν −002 −001
σε −003 −001
δj −001 001
p2000 −023 002
W2000 004 000
counterfactual economies, so highlighting each parameter’s contribution to the cross-
city differences generated by the model.
The largest contributor to the cross-city dispersion in home-ownership is dispersion
in the level of house prices. Changes in risk do affect home-ownership slightly, but the
results show that higher risk reduces home-ownership; households, on balance, do not
use home-ownership to insure themselves against housing risk. Instead, the model sug-
gests higher risk leads to lower LTVs.
5.2.1 Differences in price levels and home-ownership Differences in prices create dif-
ferences in home-ownership through the housing ladder. In both the data and the
model, households live in larger houses when they live in cheaper cities, and the dif-
ference in sizes is larger for owners than for renters.31 So, households in cheaper cities,
living in larger houses, are more likely to choose to own due to a binding maximum
rental constraint, while households in the expensive cities are more likely to rent due to a
binding minimum owner-occupied house size constraint. Likewise, differences in wages
work similarly, though the total effect is smaller. Everything else equal, higher wages in
the land-scarce cities lead to higher housing consumption and, due to the housing lad-
der, higher home-ownership (consistent with findings from Coulson and Fisher (2009)).
In our simulations, households respond to lower prices by increasing housing con-
sumption, which leads to higher home-ownership due to the housing ladder. Therefore,
households that adjust their tenure decision in response to local prices are likely doing
so to adjust their housing consumption. And so, holding housing consumption fixed, we
should expect to see no effect of price on tenure decisions. In other words, prices affect
tenure choices only through the price’s effect on housing consumption.
In the data, a critical margin of adjustment in housing consumption is between
apartments and houses.32 According to our census sample, almost all houses (85 per-
cent) are owned and almost all apartments (87 percent) are rented. Interestingly though,
31The square-footage difference in the data (using the AHS, all reported differences statistically signif-
icant) between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile city by land scarcity is 21 percent, while in the
model, the size difference is 19 percent of the average size house. For owners, the difference in house size is
15 percent and 17 percent in the data and the model, respectively. For renters, the difference is 13 percent
and 9 percent, respectively.
32Based on U.S. census data, we have defined an “apartment” as a housing unit that shares its structure
with one or more other housing units; a “house” is a single-unit structure. Note that “houses” need not be
entirely detached from other structures: a housing unit attached to another unit by a full-height dividing
wall, that goes from ground to roof, is here defined as a house.
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Figure 11. Home-ownership–price relationship by dwelling type.
among owned properties, LTV ratios (predicted for 2000 from the AHS) are almost iden-
tical across dwelling types: 084 for houses and 086 for apartments.33
In Figure 11, we plot the relationship between conditional home-ownership rates
and prices across MSAs by dwelling type: full sample, houses only, and apartments only.
The estimated effect of prices on ownership rates is more than three times as large for
the full sample as for the houses-only sample, and the relationship for apartments is ac-
tually slightly positive. Clearly then, adjustments in housing consumption (in this case,
between dwelling types) play an important part in driving the overall price–ownership
relationship. Also, Figure 11 suggests that New York City is an outlier in Figure 1 because
it has more apartments per unit of housing than the typical city with its land scarcity.
In contrast to the tenure choice, the LTV decision (conditional on ownership) is not
strongly related to housing consumption. This suggests the mechanism driving these
LTV results is independent of the housing ladder (instead, we argue below that insur-
ance motives are important). In Figure 12, we plot LTV–price relationships for the full
sample, and separately for houses and apartments. This time, the effects of log prices
are negative for both dwelling types; they are also very similar in magnitude: −0060 for
33These two statistics are means of local conditional LTVs across the 42 cities in our sample (for houses
and apartments respectively), where the conditional LTVs are estimated as described in Appendix A.
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Figure 12. LTV–price relationship by dwelling type.
houses and −0064 for apartments. It is clear that composition effects are not driving the
relationship for LTV.
5.2.2 Home-ownership and within-city differences In a general equilibrium model,
the home-ownership-as-insurance effect may lead to higher price-to-rent ratios (as
in Nordvik (2001), Sinai and Souleles (2005), Han (2013)) rather than higher home-
ownership rates in cities with high price volatility.34 So Sinai and Souleles (2005) look
at how differences in rental volatility across cities tilts the home-ownership-by-age pro-
file within cities. They find that riskier cities have steeper profiles, increasing faster
before age 60 and then decreasing faster afterward.35 This evidence is consistent with
34Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2010) build a model where insurance effects imply that home-ownership and
price-to-rent ratios are positively correlated.
35More exactly, they impute a household’s expected duration in a home using the proportion of house-
holds within the same age–occupation–education cell in an MSA that did not move the previous year. They
find that propensities to own are increasing in this proxy interacted with rental volatility (see Table II,
columns 2 and 3 from their paper). Halket and Vasudev (2014) show that differences in expected dura-
tion vary substantially by age—in part due to endogenous differences in tenure. Sinai and Souleles’s (2005)
interaction result implies a steeper age profile in riskier cities (see Figure I from their paper).
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Table 7. Ownership slopes with respect
to land scarcity for select counterfactuals.
Age σν σε p2000
21–35 −0035 −0046 −023
36–50 −0026 −0049 −019
51–65 −0005 −0010 −014
66–75 0003 −0007 −039
the hypothesis that households use home-ownership as insurance: younger households
(which are more likely to move shortly) are more likely to rent when volatility is high,
whereas older households are more likely to own.
In our data and model, we too find a steeper profile in cities with high land scarcity
and thus high volatility.36 So we can use our counterfactuals to find the cause of the
change in the steepness of the profiles. Table 7 shows that the age profiles of home-
ownership are steeper in riskier cites and in more expensive cities. Higher risk leads
to lower home-ownership for all age levels. However, the change in steepness due to
changes in the volatilities is consistent with the insurance hypothesis: both the σν and
the σε slopes increase by about 003 from the age 21–35 cell to the age 51–65 cell. If,
like Sinai and Souleles (2005), we used only the change in the steepness of the profiles
to identify the effect of risk on home-ownership, we would find that more risk leads to
more home-ownership. Quantitatively though, the change in steepness due to changes
in price levels is almost three times as large as either change from the volatility param-
eters, implying that a sizable proportion of the effect that Sinai and Souleles (2005) find
may not be due to risk. Instead, our model finds that most of the observed large change
in age profiles is because the housing ladder is more relevant at earlier ages.
5.2.3 Differences in risk and LTV Higher risk has a small effect on home-ownership,
but accounts for all of land-scarce cities’ lower LTVs. This is for two reasons. First, house-
holds save more in the high variance cities, in part due to higher price volatility, but also
due to high wage volatility. Renting is a partial hedge against falls in wages that are corre-
lated with rents and prices. However, households will not completely insure themselves
against falls in wages through rental housing, since doing so would distort their housing
consumption greatly. So households also hold more total wealth in the high covariance
economies. This extra total wealth leads to lower LTVs when the households do decide
to purchase a house.
Model households do view home-ownership as a potential source of insurance, but it
is a highly imperfect variety of insurance. Housing comprises about 25–30 percent of ex-
penditures in the model, so households would like home-ownership to comprise about
the same amount in their total wealth portfolio (including human capital) for insurance
purposes. However, most renters would have to leverage their financial wealth greatly
to buy a home, leaving them near the borrowing constraint and particularly exposed to
36From Table 5, home-ownership rates decline with land scarcity faster earlier in the life cycle. Our data
do not show a significant steepening after age 65, however.
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large falls in house prices, which are more likely in risky cities. Large falls in prices can
leave their budget sets particularly small. So households in riskier cities defer housing
purchases until they can afford to buy the house with lower leverage.37 This is consis-
tent with our finding that the share of homeowners that purchase their house without a
mortgage is not correlated with risk (or land scarcity) in the data: households with this
much financial wealth in the model are not troubled by the borrowing constraint.
There are also transactions costs: more risk leads to more mobility and lower ex-
pected durations in any given house. Since adjusting owner-occupied housing is costly,
this decreases the value of owning and thus the ownership rate. For instance, in the σε
counterfactual, the home-ownership rate for households under 35 in a typical low land
scarcity city (25th percentile) economy is 2 percentage points higher than its counter-
part at the 75th percentile. If we eliminate transactions costs, the (negative) slope of
home-ownership with respect to land scarcity halves in both risk counterfactuals. In
other words, households optimally prefer to self-insure with a risk-free bond, which
does not have transaction costs, does not distort the intratemporal consumption bun-
dle, and does not compel asset-poor households (which young would-be homeowners
largely are) to overleverage themselves, rather than insure with housing even though
housing is the only asset whose return is correlated with some of the risks the house-
hold faces.
Households do own slightly larger houses in the higher variance economies, but
there is little evidence of a housing-ladder effect as discussed in Banks et al. (2010). Their
theory is that households that expect to consume more housing than a rental can pro-
vide later in life anticipate owning later in life and, therefore, households in economies
with high risk will seek to insure themselves against the risk that prices may be high in
the future, when they are likely to own a large house, by purchasing (rather than renting)
a small house earlier.
Theoretically, the overall strength of the “ladder effect” is particularly dependent on
the nature of the housing-ladder assumptions. A very rigid ladder (where, say, the mini-
mum owner-occupied size equaled the maximum rental available, such as in Banks et al.
(2010)) can potentially have large average effects early in the life cycle. However, a rigid
ladder with a low maximum rental size would not enable our model to match the rela-
tive housing consumption of renting versus owning households seen in the data. More
importantly, if the ladder effect were large, new homeowners should be willing to buy
housing with lower down payments so as to own sooner in riskier cities. From the price
level counterfactual, we do see that households would opt for higher leverage purchases
in expensive cities so as to climb the housing ladder. If more risk also led households to
try and climb the ladder faster via larger loans, the model would not be able to match
the higher down payments (lower LTVs) in land-scarce cities in the data.
Finally, the effect of differing maintenance costs is small: maintenance after all
is only part of the cost of housing. Relatively high maintenance in low land scarcity
economies makes owner-occupancy relatively more attractive as it increases the tax
wedge in the user-cost formula, leading to very slightly higher home-ownership rates
and LTV ratios.
37These are two sides of similar coins: households worry about the risk that their house will be expensive
at the time of purchase and also the risk that their house falls in value after buying it.
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6. Regression-based inferences
We use a life-cycle model of home-ownership to ask whether households are more likely
to own when housing market volatility is higher. Our approach has been to document
stylised facts based on a cross-section of cities, which we interpret using a calibrated
model. Other studies on this topic have exploited variation in price or rent volatility
within cities over time to empirically identify the effect on ownership. Before conclud-
ing, we wish to use the language of our model to caution against such an approach.
A household’s decision to become a homeowner is a durable decision. The durability
of this decision means that at the aggregate (city) level, home-ownership rates are not
only a function of contemporaneous prices, but also of lagged prices. For instance, take
a city in the model that has high prices today but had low prices in previous years (with
constant wages) and compare it to another city with the same high prices today but
that also had high prices in the past. Let these two cities be otherwise identical in that
households in the two cities have the same expectations with regard to price levels and
volatilities going forward (i.e., these two cities have the same land scarcity value). In
other words, households with the same current state values today will make the same
choices in each of the two cities today. Note, however, that an econometrician using
historical prices to measure current expected housing volatility38 will regard the first
city as having higher expected volatility relative to the second city.
In this case, the city that is measured by the econometrician as “riskier” today will
also have a higher home-ownership rate today relative to the second city. This is be-
cause prices in the first city were lower in the past, which led some households then
to want to live in bigger houses, which meant they were more likely to own (due to the
housing-ladder constraints). When prices rise to their current level, many households
will not choose to immediately downsize, so ownership rates remain high relative to the
second city. Therefore, there is error in the measurement of expected price volatility that
is correlated with variables that do explain differences in home-ownership rates (histor-
ical price levels), and so estimates of the effect of expected volatility on home-ownership
may be biased.
Two particular attributes of this bias are worth mentioning. First, the direction of the
bias will generally depend on the direction of price movements: in the above example,
the bias is positive; if the first city instead had prices that fell to the same level as the
second city, then the bias would be negative. Second, the magnitudes of the bias are
not generally symmetric: positive shocks to prices lead to tighter borrowing constraints
and so some households are unable to own, whereas negative shocks relax borrowing
constraints and so some households are now able (but not required) to own.
6.1 Conclusion
Our model is able to explain much of the cross-city variation in home-ownership and
LTV, and matches the variation in the data for younger households. We find that it is the
38Sinai and Souleles (2005) and Banks et al. (2010) measure volatility using a 9-year window and a 5-year
rolling window of realized volatilities, respectively, in their regressions. Han (2010, 2013) use an AR(1)–
GARCH(11) process to model expectations.
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relatively higher prices in cities with scarce land that causes their lower home-ownership
rates, while it is their relatively higher volatility that causes homeowners in these cities
to borrow less. So we do not find that more risk leads households to own more. Instead,
more risk leads perhaps to a higher reliance on nonhousing savings. This result high-
lights the importance of including other means of imperfect insurance in asset alloca-
tion models with incomplete markets. Land scarcity has a larger effect on LTV in the data
than in the model. So it is probable that there are other channels through which risk may
affect LTV that are precluded in our model. For instance, it is possible that households
in risky cities hold the same amount of wealth but take smaller mortgages due to, per-
haps, higher propensities to move and the presence of prepayment penalties that are
proportional to the mortgage balance.
The main question explored in this paper concerns home-ownership and insurance.
Several of the facts developed in this paper—the relationships between land values, land
scarcity, and house prices, and between housing availability (the housing ladder) and
home-ownership—beg further examination and a full structural explanation. It would
also be worth using a general equilibrium version of the model to examine the differ-
ent local effects of aggregate (countrywide) shocks. Finally, it would be useful to ex-
plore whether land scarcity, via LTV, can help explain any recent geographical patterns in
mortgage defaults. If our model allowed for default, households may perhaps be more
likely to own in volatile cities (though this would then perhaps also imply that house-
holds would borrow more in these cities). This of course depends on the particulars of
the contracting problem between lenders and households.39
Appendix A: Data construction and robustness checks
A.1 Construction of conditional ownership rates and LTVs
Here, we describe the construction of the conditional measures of local ownership rates
and mean LTV used in cross-city analysis. For home-ownership, we first run a probit-
level regression (using the full national sample) of an ownership dummy on various
characteristics of the household head,40 together with a full set of MSA effects. Then, for
each MSA, we use the regression estimates to predict the ownership rate corresponding
to a household with the mean characteristics in each dimension.41 To estimate condi-
tional local ownership rates for a particular demographic group (e.g., an age category),
we follow exactly the same procedure, but from the beginning (i.e., even before the pro-
bit regression) restrict the sample to the relevant demographic group.
As described above, we have two alternative sources of city-specific LTV data: the
AHS and MIRS. The AHS is a longitudinal survey, containing detailed information on
39See Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011), Corbae and Quintin (2013), Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009),
Guler (2010), and Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011) for various models of default and home-ownership.
40Quadratic in age, education dummies (high school graduate, 1–3 years of college, 4 years + of college),
gender, marital status, dummies for number of children under 18 (1, 2, 3+), ethnicity dummies (black, His-
panic), and log household income.
41Because the regression is nonlinear, the mean of our “conditional” ownership rates will not equal the
mean unconditional rate. Therefore, we re-center all observations by a constant to correct for this.
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housing-related variables. The Metropolitan Survey covers 41 MSAs, and booster sam-
ples of a further 6 MSAs (the largest) are included in the national survey.42 Of these 47
cities, we have land scarcity data on 42, and, we base our AHS analysis on this set of 42.
The AHS surveys cover different MSAs in different waves, and we, therefore, rely on four
different waves to put together a complete sample for cross-city analysis: the metropoli-
tan surveys of 1998, 2002, and 2004, and the national survey of 2001. We index obser-
vations by year of purchase (rather than survey year), because we have information on
the loan amount and home price (to calculate LTV) at the purchase year. We restrict our
sample to households with mortgages, and we only study details of mortgages that were
taken out when the home was purchased. The last condition ensures that we measure
the loan and price in the same year to calculate LTV.
As with the ownership rates, all reported local LTVs from the AHS are conditional
on characteristics of the household head.43 Also, since the AHS samples are not large,
we include all households that purchased their home up to 5 years prior to the survey
year (so the full data set spans purchase years 1993–2004) to predict LTVs in 2000. The
consequent overlapping (in terms of purchase year) of the different waves allows us to
identify MSA effects. Specifically, we run an OLS regression of LTV on household charac-
teristics, purchase year dummies, and MSA dummies,44 and we predict LTV in each MSA
for a household with the mean characteristics in each dimension45 that purchased their
home in 2000. To estimate “conditional” LTV for a particular group (e.g., an age category
or loan type), we follow exactly the same procedure, but from the beginning (i.e., even
before the predicting regression) restrict the sample to the relevant group.
42In the national survey, the samples for cities other than these 6 are insufficient to derive reliable city-
specific statistics.
43Quadratic in age (at purchase year), education dummies (high school graduate, 1–3 years of college, 4
years + of college), gender, marital status, dummies for number of children under 18 at purchase year (1,
2, 3+), ethnicity dummies (black, Hispanic), and log household income (deflated by the consumer price
index (CPI) to 2000 dollars). To predict number of children at purchase year, we count the number of chil-
dren currently in the family who would have been under 18 at the purchase year; of course, children born
between the purchase and survey years are not included.
44In this regression, we exclude a number of observations that have suspect LTV values. First, we exclude
observations with home purchase prices and loans below $5000 and LTV ratios above 12. Second, the AHS
includes a number of imputed values for mortgage size; we exclude these observations, because the im-
putations are not conditional on MSA. There is also a problem with top-coding, discussed in Davis and
Palumbo (2008). In the metropolitan surveys, the top-coded values for house price and loan amount are
calculated by city (as the mean value of the top-coded observations), which is ideal for our purposes. But
this is not the case for the (relatively expensive) cities with booster samples in the national survey: there, a
national top code is used. In our sample, 10% of observations in New York City are top-coded, 9% in Los
Angeles, and 5% in Chicago. Our approach is to exclude all top-coded observations in the national survey
from the regression. However, we take some assurance from the fact that we control in the regression for
household characteristics that are correlated with top codes (e.g., household income, education); see the
following footnote.
45When estimating the means of household characteristics, we include in our sample all excluded obser-
vations detailed in the previous footnote. This should partially address the problem of omitted top codes in
the national survey (we essentially predict the LTV of the top-coded observations, based on their observed
characteristics).
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A.2 Conforming and nonconforming loans
Here, we consider the impact of conforming loan limits.46 The existence of this nation-
ally uniform loan limit may well be responsible for our LTV result. In more expensive
cities, the conforming loan limit is more likely to bind. As a result, households will be
forced to make a larger down payment (to qualify for the cheaper rates on conform-
ing loans), and this will yield a negative correlation between price and LTV (and, con-
sequently, between price risk and LTV too). If the conforming loan limit is driving our
results, then the effect should be stronger the closer is the loan size to the conforming
loan limit: increases in land value would be less likely to lead to increases in loan value
if that means the household will go over the conforming loan size limit.
To test whether the loan limit is driving this effect, we check the LTV–price level/
volatility correlation in samples delineated by the ratio of loan size to loan limit (restrict-
ing our attention to households with conventional mortgages). It turns out, though, that
the correlation is strongly negative (especially) for loans well below the limit and less so
for loans close to the limit. So we conclude that the loan limit cannot be responsible for
the correlation.
The results are reported in Table 8. In each case, observations are at the household
level and the dependent variable is LTV. The regressor of interest is price volatility in
Panel A and log house price in Panel B. Also included are a range of household-level
controls (see the table notes) and a full set of purchase year fixed effects (we only include
households that purchased their home between 1993 and 2004).
Regressions are disaggregated into samples delineated by the loan-limit ratio. Also,
the sample is restricted to households with conventional mortgages (we are interested in
the impact of the conforming loan limit). The loan-limit ratio for each sample is reported
at the top of the columns (0–025, 025–05, 05–075, 075–1, 1–125, 125–15, and >15).
The effect on LTV is negative in all samples for both price volatility and levels. For
volatility (Panel A), the effect is very large and statistically significant for the 0–025 sam-
ple (−49) and the 025–05 sample (−16), but the effects for all the other samples fall be-
low 08 and are statistically insignificant. The effects around the conforming loan limit
(075–1 and 1–125) actually tend to be smaller than elsewhere. This suggests that the
negative effect is not being driven by some interaction with the conforming loan limit.
The patterns are very similar for price level in Panel B, though more of the samples are
statistically significant.
46Mortgages in the United States fall into different categories. Mortgage loans may either be conven-
tional or nonconventional. To qualify for a conventional loan, households must pass credit and income
tests (known as PITI tests: principal–interest–taxes–insurance). If they cannot afford a threshold down pay-
ment (often as high as 20%), they will also have to purchase PMI (private mortgage insurance) to qualify
for a conventional loan. Nonconventional loans are guaranteed by the government, through the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) or Department of Veteran Affairs (VA). They tend to be more appropriate
for households that require a large LTV. Conventional loans may be either conforming or nonconforming.
Loans are conforming if they fall below a dollar threshold, which varies with time. Until 2008, this threshold
was nationally uniform (our sample excludes years after 2008). Conforming loans are subject to cheaper
rates, because they are more liquid: Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac will provide guarantees enabling a lender
to sell them to the secondary market. See, for example, Caplin et al. (1997) for further detail.
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Table 8. Regressions of LTV on price volatilities and levels for samples delineated by the loan-
limit ratio.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample: Loan Limit 0–025 025–05 05–075 075–1 1–125 125–15 >15
Panel A: Price Volatilities
House price volatility −4882∗∗∗ −1593∗∗∗ −0587 −0223 −0552 −0767 −0474
(1653) (0586) (0392) (0483) (0380) (0455) (0863)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purchase year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1360 4566 3285 1506 550 275 304
MSAs 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0051 0020 0007 0008 0055 0099 0169
Panel B: Price Levels
Log house price −0388∗∗∗ −0116∗∗∗ −0042∗∗∗ −0005 −0031∗ −0042∗∗ −0055
(0051) (0017) (0014) (0021) (0017) (0019) (0033)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purchase year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1360 4566 3285 1506 550 275 304
MSAs 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0119 0037 0012 0008 0060 0108 0189
Note: Regressions are run separately for samples delineated by the loan-limit ratio (the ratio of loan size to conforming
loan limit, reported above each column). For each sample, we separately estimate the effect of price volatility (in Panel A)
and log price level (in Panel B) on household-level LTV. All regressions control for the household characteristics listed earlier
in Appendix A (i.e., those used to condition the local LTV estimates) as well as a full set of purchase year effects. We use the
composite sample described earlier in Appendix A, though we exclude all household with nonconventional mortgages. There
are 42 MSAs in the sample. Standard errors (SEs), clustered by city, are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p< 001, ∗∗ p< 005, ∗ p< 01.
A.3 Local variation in effective interest rates
An alternative hypothesis is that banks subject households in riskier cities to higher
mortgage interest rates—and this could explain the lower ownership rate in these cities.
Similarly, it could explain why households in these cities choose to take out smaller loans
(relative to home value). Interest rates may also vary across cities because of differences
in state-level regulation.
However, it turns out that effective interest rates47 are actually lower in expensive/
risky/land-scarce cities. This is illustrated by Figure 13, using data from the MIRS on 25
major cities. There is a strong negative correlation across cities between the interest rate,
and both price risk and level (R squared is 40–50 percent in each case). The interest rate
varies from 7 percent in the most expensive/risky/land-scarce cities to 8 percent in the
least. And so this cannot explain why ownership rates and LTV ratios are also lower in
expensive cities.
A.4 Dynamic wealth explanations
The lower LTVs in land-scarce cities might also be explained by the contemporaneous
emergence of significant local wealth, allowing home-buyers to put down large deposits
47“Effective” because it accounts for any up-front fees.
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Figure 13. Effective mortgage interest rate, price risk, and price levels.
(with more modest loan requirements). In particular, this wealth may originate from
recent local house price growth: as argued above, land-scarce cities tend to experience
larger price booms (and busts). In Figure 14, we plot local house price growth separately
for recent decades (1980s, 1990s, 2000s) against land scarcity.48 Prices grew significantly
faster in land-scarce cities in the 1980s and 2000s.
If wealth effects from house price trends are responsible for the LTV results, we
should find that the patterns are driven by purchases by previous homeowners rather
than first-time buyers. Fortunately, the AHS data allow us to estimate conditional LTV
separately for each of these buyer types. In Figure 15, we plot conditional LTV (in 2000)
on land scarcity, separately for previous homeowners and first-time buyers. Reassur-
ingly, the coefficient of the OLS-estimated slope is identical in each case (009). This
suggests that housing wealth effects are not driving the results.
48Local price growth is estimated from the IPUMS census extracts of 1980, 1990, and 2000 and the Amer-
ican Community Survey of 2010. The sample size in these plots varies across periods because the sample
of MSAs is not identical in each census cross section. Note that the geographical definitions of these MSAs
has also changed over time, as the cities have expanded.
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Figure 14. House price growth and land scarcity by decade.
It is true that the down payments of first-time buyers may be funded by relatives,
who have benefited from growing local housing wealth. However, only a small frac-
tion of households (5 percent in our sample) report that the main source of their down
payment was an inheritance or gift. Reestimating the results without these households
makes only a negligible difference to these results.
An alternative source of expanding local wealth is contemporaneous wage growth.
However, Figure 16 shows that the growth of average wages in the 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s is uncorrelated with the land scarcity instrument.49
A.5 Land share, price levels, and volatilities
In this section, we explain why land share is an important factor for both house price lev-
els and volatilities. Consider first the cross-city variation in price levels. The first panel of
Figure 17 shows that there is substantial variation across cities in house price levels (the
range covers 2 log points). But, comparing the final two panels of Figure 17, the cross-
city variation in structure costs is negligible: it is land values that are driving the large
49Local wage growth is estimated from the IPUMS census extracts of 1980, 1990, and 2000 and the Amer-
ican Community Survey of 2010.
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Figure 15. LTV and land scarcity by buyer type.
Figure 16. Wage growth and land scarcity by decade.
variation in house prices. Clearly then, cities with larger land shares will have higher
house prices. In further results in the supplementary appendix, we confirm that the ef-
fect on price levels comes entirely through the land value component (structure costs
are uncorrelated with land share).
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Figure 17. Histograms of city price, structure cost, and land value levels.
Next, consider the variation in house price volatilities, that is, the standard devia-
tions over annual growth rates. As with the price levels, the first panel of Figure 18 reveals
large variation in volatilities, ranging from 0006 to 0075. It turns out that the covariance
between the growth rates of land and structure costs within a city over time is, on aver-
age, negligible. And so the standard deviation of house price growth over time within a
city can be approximated as
σj
(
g
hp
jt
)≈ ljtσj(glvjt )+ (1− ljt)σj(gscjt ) (6)
where ljt is land share, and glvjt , g
sc
jt , and g
hp
jt are the annual growth rates of land val-
ues, structure costs, and house prices, respectively. In the supplementary appendix, we
show that the volatilities of land values and structure costs are individually uncorrelated
with land shares. And, as can be seen in Figure 18, the volatility of land value is an or-
der of magnitude larger than the volatility of structure costs. Therefore, according to
equation (6), house price volatility will be strongly positively correlated with land share
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Figure 18. Histograms of city price, structure cost, and land value volatilities.
through a composition effect. And indeed, Figure 6 confirms that both local house prices
levels and volatilities are increasing in land share.50
Appendix B: Parametrization
B.1 Household life cycle and preferences
We calibrate the discount factor, β = 095, and housing’s share in the utility function,
σ = 03 following Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010), and the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, φ = 5, following Piazzesi, Schneider, and
Tuzel (2007). Estimates of risk aversion vary widely, particularly when the parameter
is separately identified from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Some studies
have point estimates with γ = 20 or higher but with equally large confidence intervals
(see Attanasio and Weber (2010), Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003), and, for values
over 100, Yogo (2006)). Since such a large value of γ would imply an outlandish level of
50Reported land share is the mean over the four quarters of 2000, based on estimates from Davis and
Palumbo (2008).
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Table 9. Family size equivalence scale.
Family Size L-M Orshansky (1965) U.S. Dept. of Commerce F-V&K
1 100 100 100 100
2 106 126 128 134
3 128 151 157 165
4 147 189 201 197
5 169 223 237 227
precautionary savings in our model, we choose γ = 3, which is well within the more tra-
ditional range of 2–5 that most studies prefer (see Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010),
Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sorensen (2010), Li and Yao (2007)).
B.1.1 Family size equivalence We collect data from the period 1970–1993 in the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS). We control for year effects by using year dummies. The
family size profile is generated by the regression
Fiat =
81∑
k=21
βk1k +
1993∑
t ′=1970
βt ′1t ′ + εiat
where 1k is a year dummy, which takes on value 1 when a= k, and 1t ′ is the year dummy
that takes on value 1 when t ′ = t.
Figure 19 shows the profiles of family size from the CPS. Family size increases sharply
when the household is young, peaking at age 39.
To adjust the household’s housing and consumption stream, we use a household
equivalence scale. The objective of an equivalence scale is to measure the change in
consumption needed to keep the welfare of the family constant as the family size varies.
Note that using per capita consumption assumes that the family converts consump-
tion expenditure into utility flow following constant returns to scale. Lazear and Michael
(1980) point to the existence of family goods, economies of scale, and complementari-
ties, which are all factors that they show to be significant. We therefore use a household
equivalence scale that is not constant returns to scale. Table 9 lists some equivalence
scales. L-M stands for Lazear and Michael (1980), U.S. Dept. of Commerce refers to
US Department of Commerce (1991), and F-V&K stands for Fernandez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2007). Lazear and Michael’s scale takes greater account of common or pub-
lic goods, so that the impact of family size is less than other equivalence scales (com-
pare, for instance, Orshansky (1965)). We use the housing equivalence scale used by
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007).
All households in the model economy have the same life-cycle profile of family size,
which is set to the average family size at each age in the CPS. To account for noninte-
ger family sizes, we assume that the adjustment factor is linear within the family sizes
specified in Table 9. Figure 19 shows the equivalent, normalized family size over the life
cycle.
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Figure 19. L-M adjusted family size profile (yearly bins).
B.2 Assets
We set the down payment requirement, d = 01. We set the transaction cost of buying,
θb = 008, within the range typically chosen in the literature (Martin (2003), Fisher and
Gervais (2011)). We set the interest rates at rl = 004. The average difference between a
30 year fixed rate mortgage and the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond is between 1 percent and
2 percent for 1977–2010, so we set rb = 006.
B.2.1 Initial wealth distribution We calibrate the wealth distribution of newborns us-
ing the distribution of wealth among 21–25 year olds in the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) waves from 1989–2001. We drop top-coded observations, households with nega-
tive wealth, and students from the sample, and use the sample weights provided by the
SCF. We parametrize the initial wealth distribution as an exponential distribution. That
gives us one parameter that we have to match,
f (b0)= λwe−λwb0
where b0 is the initial wealth and λw is the parameter to estimate in the exponential
distribution. We estimate λw by matching the mean of the initial wealth distribution:
λw = 1
b¯0

This gives us λw = 000589. We convert the initial wealth distribution in the data to model
terms by scaling by the ratio of average labor earnings at age 21 in the model to average
labor earnings at age 21 in the data.
B.3 Taxes
There are two forms of taxes in the model economy—income tax, ty , and property tax, tp.
Piketty and Saez (2007) use public use microfiles of tax return data from the Internal
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Revenue Service, which have the advantage of being aggregated to the household level
already. The income tax rate we choose, ty = 02, is in the same range that they compute
for the U.S. economy.51
We use data from the IPUMS 1990 5 percent sample. The variables used are the
amount of property tax paid and the estimated value of the house. We remove top-coded
variables from the sample and consider only owner-occupiers. Sample observations are
weighted using the household weights given in the data set. The weighted average of the
ratio of the amount of property tax paid to the estimated value of the house is 0012. In
the model, we set tp = 001.
B.4 Earnings process
We parametrize the idiosyncratic and age-profile portion of the household’s earnings
following Halket and Vasudev (2014), who estimate a process similar to Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2004a) but also control for regional variability (in their case, at the
U.S. state level) in earnings rather than just national variability. We set the standard de-
viation of idiosyncratic innovations, σψ = 0098, and let the initial (fixed effect) distri-
bution have a standard deviation of 05 (since the persistent component of earning fol-
lows a random walk, a fixed effect is equivalent to households entering at age 21 with a
value ψi21 drawn from normal distribution with standard deviation 05). As is well known,
the variance of the transitory shock is not separately easily identified from the variance
of measurement error in these approaches to estimation. We set σ
 = 025, which is
within bounds found by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004b), Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Preston (2008). We discretize the innovations with a three-point distribution following
Tauchen (1986).
We set the pension at 60 percent of final earnings, ζ = 06.
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